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1IPs

This section tracks all 1IPs that have made it to the Phase-4: Snapshot Vote of the Proposal Lifecycle.

Passed#

All 1IPs that have successfully passed the Phase-4 vote. These 1IPs have already been implemented or are in the process of being implemented:

[1IP-25][Fast-Track] Deploy 1inch Fusion Mode on Multiple Networks#

Full Proposal Description

Author

@RoundElephant

Simple Summary

This proposal calls for the deployment of 1inch Fusion Mode on multiple networks, specifically: BNB Chain, Polygon, Optimism, Arbitrum, Gnosis, Avalanche, Fantom, Klaytn, and Aurora.

Abstract

If passed, this proposal calls for 1inch Fusion Mode to be deployed on all networks currently supported by 1inch Network. By deploying 1inch Fusion Mode on multiple networks, all 1inch users will be able to benefit from the UX and pricing improvements, regardless of what chain they are on.

Motivation

The deployment of 1inch Fusion Mode on these networks will give all 1inch users, on all chains, access to the better pricing offered by 1inch Fusion Mode. By allowing users to access 1inch's liquidity aggregation technology on these networks, users will benefit from improved liquidity, lower slippage, and more competitive pricing.

With 1inch Fusion Mode, resolvers pay the gas for the end user – this allows users who hold no native fee token in their wallet to still make swaps.

Specification

This proposal serves as a signal from the 1inch Network DAO to 1inch Labs. Once passed, the 1inch DAO calls for 1inch Labs to deploy 1inch Fusion Mode on BNB Chain, Polygon, Optimism, Arbitrum, Gnosis, Avalanche, Fantom, Klaytn, and Aurora.

Rationale

By deploying 1inch Fusion Mode on these chains, the 1inch Network will be able to increase adoption while also improving the UX for all 1inch users.

These deployments will reduce the barriers of entry for users who want the best user experience offered by 1inch.

Considerations

Deploying 1inch Fusion Mode on multiple networks has no governance implications.

There is no financial cost to the 1inch DAO, as this proposal is calling for the 1inch Foundation to fund the deployment.

[1IP-24][Fast-Track] Deploy 1inch Network Protocols on zkSync Era#

Full Proposal Description

Author

@RoundElephant

References

Simple Summary

This proposal calls for the deployment of the 1inch Aggregation Protocol, 1inch Limit Order Protocol, and 1inch Fusion Mode on zkSync Era.

Abstract

If passed, this proposal will call for the deployment of the 1inch Aggregation Protocol, 1inch Limit Order Protocol, and 1inch Fusion Mode on zkSync Era.zkSync Era is a Layer-2 protocol that allows Ethereum to scale in a trustless and decentralized manner – this deployment will allow 1inch users to make ultra cheap transactions with Ethereum-level security.

Motivation

By deploying the 1inch Network protocols on zkSync Era, users will benefit from lower gas fees and faster transaction confirmations. This will make the full suite of 1inch Network protocols more accessible for users without sacrificing the security of the protocol.

Specification

This proposal serves as a signal from the 1inch Network DAO to 1inch Labs. Once passed, the 1inch DAO calls for 1inch Labs to deploy the 1inch Aggregation Protocol, 1inch Limit Order Protocol, and 1inch Fusion Mode on zkSync Era. 1inch Labs shall also maintain the deployment to ensure an optimum user experience.

The deployment of 1inch Network protocols on zkSync Era will require collaboration between the 1inch core contributors and core contributors of Matter Labs.

Rationale

zkSync Era is the first zero knowledge rollup with generalized EVM compatibility live on mainnet. Deploying the 1inch Network protocols on zkSync Era will directly benefit both the users of 1inch protocols as well as the 1inch Network itself: users will have a less expensive way to make transactions with L1 level security, while the 1inch Network will benefit from the increased volume and adoption.

Considerations

The deployment of 1inch Network protocols on zkSync Era has no governance implications.

1inch will have no liquidity locked on zkSync Era, there is no security risk associated with this deployment.

The increased usage should lead to higher treasury revenues for the 1inch DAO.

[1IP-21] 1inch NFT Marketplace MVP#

Proposal Summary

TL;DR

  • Proposal for a $387,022 NFT Marketplace platform on the 1inch Network
  • Funding distribution: $92,000 upfront and 4 milestones unlocking rest of the payments
  • Aggregated Marketplace with level-1 analytic tools, NFT aggregation from Ethereum, Binance, and Polygon blockchains, and unique 1inch Marketplace
  • Includes spam/fake collection filters, level I Analytics, Powertools phase I, Buy Now, Bids, Create a NFT, Launchpad, Social/Education, and Empowering the community features
  • 6-month project with breakdown of costs for Product management, Design, Business development, Operation costs, Corp services, and Dev costs
  • Milestone-based funding unlock with predefined success factors and acceptance criteria
  • 1inchDAO will benefit from empowering analytics & browsing tools, educational content, and potential revenue channels

[1IP-20] 1INCH Fast Track Proposal#

Full Proposal Description

Authors: @Bobby_StableLab , @Kene_StableLab

References 1inch governance process

Simple Summary

1IP-XX introduces an alternative streamlined governance process to be used in an emergency, termed “Fast-Track Proposal”. Fast-track proposals will have a lifecycle of 72 hours due to the nature of the proposal.

Abstract

As 1inch DAO further decentralizes, a fast-track process will be necessary to address emergencies. These fast-track proposals will enable the DAO to take immediate action; instead of relying on the standard governance process.
1IP-XX outlines the domains or situations that permit a fast-track proposal and its scope to prevent malicious abuse.

Motivation

Motivation

There will be emergencies where we will need to perform an urgent vote for the sake of the DAO. The existing Snapshot + Safesnap proposal lifecycle takes a minimum of 18 days, which makes rapid responses impossible.

Specification

  1. Fast-track process
  2. Scope of the fast-track process
  3. Governance Council

Fast-track Process

  1. Governance Thread for 24 hours
  2. Snapshot Vote for 48 hours

Implementing a fast-track proposal would decrease the time to pass a proposal from 8 days to 3 days.

To indicate a fast-track proposal, community members will have to insert “[Fast-Track]” into the title of a proposal i.e., “[Fast-Track] 1IP-20: Deploy 1INCH on BASE”. This is to alert community members about the nature of the proposal. This will also introduce a new tag to the 1inch forum, “Fast-Track” to keep track of all fast-track proposals.

Scope of the fast-track process

This process can be utilized under the following circumstances.

  1. Deploying 1INCH on new networks
  2. Changes to the Governance Process i.e. Adding abstain, raising or decreasing quorum, adding a new gov process.
  3. Changes surrounding the 1inch resolver

Whitelisted addresses

Due to the low governance participation in 1inch DAO, introducing a fast-track process can open the DAO to certain vulnerabilities. Malicious actors can take advantage of the fast-track process, so we recommend forming a public list of whitelisted addresses that are allowed to propose fast-track proposals.
These addresses/individuals will be on the forums.
We believe that the following community members should be on the initial whitelist:

  • RoundElephant:0x824732D3F4Eb94a20254cca9DE10485Ce445Bb40
  • Natalia: 0x94B85505Dd701f522cDA4F1e7Ea4bA855eef24bf
  • StableLab: 0xea172676E4105e92Cc52DBf45fD93b274eC96676
  • DAOplomats: Dmat-defi.pod.xyz

Due to its swift nature, these votes could go unnoticed; therefore, we must have a fast-track whitelist in place to prevent damaging behavior.

How to add whitelisted addresses:

For a new address to be whitelisted, an already whitelisted address must nominate the new addresses. This nomination would be done in a forum post, and subsequently, go through the 1inch DAO Governance Process, and finally go to a governance vote to determine if the address or addresses should be whitelisted.

SnapShot Subspace

To facilitate the fast-track process, 1inch DAO will need to set up a separate snapshot subspace. This is necessary because this snapshot currently does not allow for different lengths for different proposals.
The newly created snapshot subspace would have a shorter voting period of 2 days.

Implementation

This is how the fast-track proposal would look in practice:

  1. Whitelisted member post a fast-track proposal on the 1inch forum with “[Fast-Track]” in the title
  2. Any non-whitelisted members who post a fast-track proposal to Snapshot, will have their proposals taken down.
  3. After 24 hours, it will move forward to SnapShot.
  4. 1inch token holders will now vote on a proposal via SnapShot.

Rationale

Every DAO needs a fast-track proposal process to cater to processes which require timely intervention; 1inch’s Governance process would require a large amount of time from discussion to voting duration to cater to an emergency. As the 1inch protocol decentralizes, the community needs this fast-track process to address time-sensitive emergencies.

[1IP-19] Increase the Number of Whitelisted Fusion Mode Resolver to 10#

Full Proposal Description

Author: @RoundElephant

Phase-1 Discussion: Increase Number of Whilisted Resolvers


Simple Summary

This proposal seeks to increase the number of whitelisted resolvers in 1inch Fusion mode from five (5) to ten (10).

Abstract

If passed, this proposal will expand the 1inch Fusion mode resolver whitelist to ten (currently five). All ten resolvers will be able to participate in every stage of the Dutch auction.

Motivation

Currently, only the top five resolvers, ranked according to their Unicorn Power, are able to fill orders during the first four minutes of the Dutch auction. This proposal will increase this number of whitelisted resolvers from five to ten — this will improve competition.

Specification

This proposal serves as a signal from the 1inch Network DAO to 1inch Labs. Once passed, the 1inch Network DAO calls for 1inch Labs to increase the number of whitelisted Fusion mode resolvers from five (5) to ten (10).

Rationale

User benefits: This proposal aims to increase the resolver competition, offering users better rates.

Resolver benefits: This proposal aims to make becoming a Fusion mode resolver more attractive, as it reduces the individual capital requirements.

Considerations

1inch Fusion mode has already been audited and deployed. This proposal will have no negative security implications as it will only change the amount of participants in the first four minutes of the Dutch auction.

[1IP-18] 1inch Analytics Dashboard#

Full Proposal Description

Summary

We propose to build a dedicated analytics dashboard for the 1inch ecosystem, allowing users to analyze the protocol's main KPIs, activity, treasury, and token related metrics. This proposal is coming along after several meetings with 1inch core team. We determined the requirements scope and technical design together.

Abstract

The dashboard will allow anyone in the community to browse the protocol's treasury, KPIs, token metrics, and transactions. The dashboard will initially support the following chains:

  • Ethereum
  • Polygon
  • Avalanche
  • Arbitrum
  • Optimism
  • BSC Dashboard will be served on a dedicated web app.

Motivation

  • Make the protocol's key information as accessible and transparent as possible.
  • Help governance and users with decision-making.
  • Provide more thorough information than currently available on Dune (i.e breakdown per user, search tooling)

Specification

This dashboard will be built using the Dune API as a data source. Data from Dune will then be indexed on an intermediate database for easy and quick access. We propose to create the following subsections for the dashboard:

Homepage (Protocol KPIs)

The UI would be somewhat similar to this: https://info.notional.finance/

  • Users
  • DAU, WAU, MAU
  • Cumulative user count
  • Transactions
  • Daily, weekly and month trade count
  • Breakdown of the number of trades per DEX
  • Volume
  • Daily volume, weekly volume, monthly volume
  • Average trade size (daily, weekly, monthly)
  • Median trade size (daily, weekly, monthly)
  • Volume by underlying liquidity source

1inch Fusion

  • 1inch Fusion KPIs
  • Total orders, volume, unique users (current + historical)
  • Latest and top transactions
  • Explore and compare resolvers
  • Search by address
  • Compare and access all resolvers in a leaderboard view - Sort by unicorn power, staked 1Inch, all-time fees, total orders, …
  • Breakdown per resolver (Total orders and volume, Historical orders and volume, Historical fees, Staked 1inch / unicorn power / lockout period)

Treasury

The UI would be somewhat similar to this: https://info.notional.finance/treasury

  • Protocol treasury balances per token.
  • Cumulative treasury revenue over time (per token type)
  • List of recent treasury transactions
  • Protocol revenues (daily/weekly/monthly)
  • Revenue as a percentage of volume (daily/weekly/monthly)

1INCH/st1INCH token section

The UI would be somewhat similar to this: https://info.notional.finance/note-token

  • Token price over time
  • Token unlock supply schedule over time
  • TVL
  • Amount of staked 1INCH (st1INCH) over time
  • Staking rewards

Recent Transactions

The UI would be somewhat similar to this: https://info.notional.finance/transactions

  • List of recent transactions (tx amount, user, main liquidity source, link to etherscan)
  • Filter for a given account

Transaction gas cost estimate

Similar to what we show on the left side of the screen here: https://info.notional.finance/

  • Estimated gas cost in USD
  • Gas price in GWEI chart
  • ETH price Hosting and maintenance of the web app will be provided by the Shippooor team.

Rationale

Dune analytics is the current solution for surfacing most of that information. Due to technical limitations, Dune does not allow surfacing per-user information and does not provide useful search features. Also, in general, Dune dashboards have a hard time getting the reach they deserve. Not only the information is often non-trivial to understand, but the dashboards themselves are hard to find. 1 Inch Dune account: https://dune.com/1inch Important Dune Dashboards: https://dune.com/1inch/main https://dune.com/1inch/fusion

Considerations

Hosting and Maintenance

Website will be hosted through 1inch subdomain (i.e info.1inch.io) Shippooor commits to 1 year maintenance. Will be renewed through governance afterward. Code will be open sourced.

Costs

Dune API integration work & intermediary database - $35k

  • Identify and expose all existing Dune queries that will provide data (historical volume, DAU, transactions, protoco, 1inch token)
  • Write new Dune queries for missing data (i.e breakdown per resolver, treasury balances/historical data)
  • Implement cron workers that will sync all Dune queries with DB through Dune API
  • Convert Dune data structures to fit DB's model
  • Design and implement a relational model that will allow to quickly query and filter the data (wallets, transactions, 1inch fusion resolvers, treasury portfolios, historical data, etc.)
  • Design and implement a production setup on AWS (or other cloud provider if needed) supporting all of the above + CI/CD. Likely going to be Amplify + Postgres on RDS
  • Setup logging and alert to help with monitoring

Front-end work - $25k

  • Build an API that will serve all of the aforementioned indexed data and will allow filtering/sorting (likely going to be a GQL API with similar structure as subgraphs).
  • Build a NextJS app that will serve all of the views mentioned in specs.

Design - $15k

  • Visual design and implementation work for page layouts, charts, tables, filtering, sorting, etc.

Maintenance: $10k for year 1

  • Regular infra monitoring and any bug fixing that may occur
  • Minor specification changes

Total: $85k

Payment structure

We propose to receive $25K upfront and the rest of the grant upon delivery of the dashboard. This way the 1Inch grant program takes minimal financial risk and our compensation is based on the delivery of the dashboard. We are also willing to break down the grant in multiple smaller milestones if necessary. Receiving address: 0x70cd17186aae48729f12dba63ba5a9abe7b4116d

Timeline

We expect to be able to deliver the dashboard within 8-12 weeks from the grant approval date.

Team

Our team has extensive experience in crypto, finance, and software engineering. As builders, we've completed several projects for notable projects including:

[1IP-17] 1inch DAO Donation to Humanitarian Relief Efforts in Turkiye#

Full Proposal Description

Author: RoundElephant

Disclaimer: One of the projects originally listed in this proposal, Ahbap, has ceased the acceptance of donations on Ethereum. Consequently, this proposal has been modified from its original form to exclude the Ahbap donation and now calls for this to be sent to the BanklessDAO’s Turkey Disaster Relief Fund.

Summary

This proposal calls for 1inch DAO to donate $100,000 USD towards humanitarian relief efforts in response to the devastating earthquakes that struck Turkiye (Turkey) on February 6th, 2023.

Abstract

This 1IP proposes a donation of $100,000 from the 1inch DAO treasury towards humanitarian relief efforts responding to the devastating earthquakes that occurred on 6 February 2023 in southern and central Turkey. This donation is intended to help save the lives of the victims who are facing severe shortages of food, shelter, medical supplies, clean water access, electricity supply disruption etc., due to extensive damage caused by these earthquakes.

The donation will be split equally between Anka and BanklessDAO Turkey Disaster Relief Fund -- both projects have been vetted by the Ethereum community and the author.

Motivation

This proposal seeks to express solidarity with those affected by this tragedy while also providing tangible support for ongoing relief efforts being carried out by non-profit organizations.

By donating funds directly to these non-profits we can ensure our contribution will be used effectively where it matters most -- supporting people impacted across Turkiye.

BanklessDAO Turkey Disaster Relief Fund is focused on humanitarian relief for those impacted by the earthquakes. They are thoroughly vetting several NGOs to distribute funds to.

Anka is a crypto relief fund that was created to support the people of Turkiye after the disastrous earthquakes that hit the region. They have over 50 volunteers working on the project including a team located in Turkiye. Anka is committed to transparency and accountability.

Specification

Send $100,000 of 1inch DAO Treasury funds to the following causes:

Rationale

Given current estimates of over 20,000 fatalities, over 70,000 severe injuries, and several million displaced — there is an urgent need for immediate assistance. The faster we act, the more lives we potentially save.

The donation must be made on-chain so that the funds can trustlessly be spent via a DAO vote.

Considerations

From a security standpoint, there are no major implications associated with this proposal other than verifying that the Safesnap transaction data is correct.

Though Syria was also affected by the earthquake, it is currently under international sanctions and has been omitted from this proposal. All funds will go to humanitarian efforts Turkiye.

[1IP-16] Community Governance Incentives#

Full Proposal Description

Author: @Bobbay_StableLab

References

Governance process

Hop example

Idle Finance example

MakerDAO

1inch on layer 3

Introduction

To boost governance activity on 1inch, we would like to incentivize community members to present proposals and receive rewards.

Motivation

An active governance culture is an essential aspect of every DAO’s operations. Active governance means that the community is dedicated to improving the protocol’s operations, which builds a culture of iteration around the protocol. However, governance work is continuously under or unpaid, making it an unattractive role.

By incentivizing an active governance culture at 1inch, we can attract participants to become more involved in 1inch DAO, thus enabling more opportunities for 1INCH to decentralize. 1INCH DAO tried a similar program last year using Layer 3, which was successful in attracting participants.

Specification

Contents

  1. Aims

  2. Allocation

  3. Eligibility

  4. Eligible Proposals

  5. Ineligible Proposals

  6. Eligible Recipients

  7. Distribution

  8. Administration

  9. Accountability

  10. Reflection

Aims

1INCH governance is still somewhat inactive, and in these current market conditions, it is even harder to attract governance participation. We hope some form of incentive will attract users to engage with the 1inch DAO.

We would like to present this program for 6 months at a total cost of 6,000 USDC.

Allocation

This proposal would allocate 6,000 USDC to a newly-made community multi-sig. Each successful proposal would receive 500 USDC.  At the end of each month, the community multi-sig will distribute rewards to the eligible authors. This is to reduce the unnecessary cost to the DAO.

This would incentivize a total of 12 proposals across 6 months.

Since 1INCH earns protocol revenue in USDC, it is easier to distribute governance rewards in USDC. If all USDC is distributed, this would cost the DAO 6,000 USDC for 6 months.

Eligibility

Eligible Proposals

All proposals that follow the outlined governance workflow within 1inch DAO and successfully pass Phase 4.

Ineligible Proposals

  1. Proposals requesting budgets or grants are excluded.

  2. Grants are directed to the current 1inch grant program.

  3. Proposals making minimal amendments to previous proposals (e.g. fixing only typos) are excluded from this program.

  4. Proposals that have no direct, actionable outcome (e.g. establishing a mission statement) are excluded from this program.

Eligible Recipients

The original authors of a proposal are considered the eligible recipients of the reward. Those who initiate the Snapshot vote will not be eligible for a reward. If there are multiple authors of a proposal, it will be assumed that the reward will be evenly split unless explicitly stated otherwise to the community multi-sig disbursers.

Multi-sig

Multi-sig address: 0x45e84e10e8E85c583C002A40007D10629EF80fAF

Stablelab: 0xea172676E4105e92Cc52DBf45fD93b274eC96676

DAOPlaomats: 0x7C2A118717Acf3C821C584506FA5a080cfa6105C

RoundElephant: 0x824732D3F4Eb94a20254cca9DE10485Ce445Bb40

Natalia: 0x94B85505Dd701f522cDA4F1e7Ea4bA855eef24bf

Distribution

@RoundElephant , Natalia, StableLab and @DAOplomats.eth can form the newly made community multi-sig for these community incentives with a 2/4 signature.

Multi-Sig Address: 0x45e84e10e8E85c583C002A40007D10629EF80fAF

Authors of a proposal should communicate with community multi-sig signers to provide the correct wallet information for distribution. Wallet information can be communicated in private, but all transactions are public since they are on the blockchain.

Distribution will occur at the beginning of the following month.

StableLab, 1INCH Core Contributors and DAOplaomats will be exempt from this program and will not be eligible to receive any rewards.

Administration

  1. StableLab provides a monthly update of eligible proposals at the end of each month.

  2. Community multi-sig distributes funds in the first week of the following month.

  3. Any unspent funds at the end of 6 months will be sent back to the 1inch DAO treasury.

Accountability

StableLab,DAOPlaomats, Jordan and Natalia will document a public record on the forum of all successful proposals providing the following information:

  1. Link to Proposal

  2. Summary of Proposal

  3. Authors

  4. Transaction Payments

This will help us review this proposal and consider whether 1INCH DAO should continue to provide governance incentives or pause the program.

Reflection

The community can review these governance incentives after 6 months to evaluate their success and whether to let it continue or pause the program.

Next Steps

  1. Temperature check with a poll on the forum

  2. Move to a SnapShot poll

[Yes]: Move forward with this program [No]: Do not implement this program [Abstain]

  1. If this proposal passes the following will happen: 6,000 USDC will be transferred to 0x45e84e10e8E85c583C002A40007D10629EF80fAF

[1IP-15] Update 1inch DAO Voting Process to Include ‘Abstain’ option#

Full Proposal Description

Author: DAOplomats.eth

#Simple Summary

This proposal aims to add an “Abstain” option in the 1inch DAO governance process, allowing members to abstain from voting.

#Abstract

This proposal aims to add Adding the abstain option, in addition to “Yes” and “No”, allowing voters and delegates to participate in voting without having to take a side.

Motivation

The current governance process of the 1inch DAO only allows members to vote Yes or No on proposals. This system can be limiting as it does not allow members to express their opinions accurately, particularly if they are unsure of the consequences of a proposal or do not have enough information to make a decision. Adding an Abstain option to the voting process will allow members to express their views more accurately and increase the overall transparency of the governance process.

Specification

Under the current governance process, the voting options are limited to ‘Yes’ or ‘No’

If this proposal is successfully implemented, the following changes will be reflected.

image

Proposed Changes

|| During this period, addresses with voting power may vote for, against or abstain from voting on the proposal using the same three voting options as the Phase-3 poll:

(Yes) In favour of this proposal.

(No) Against this proposal.||

(Abstain) Neither In favour nor Against

The Abstain Button is expected to be used in the following cases

Neutrality: The Abstain option allows members to remain neutral on a proposal and not take a stance, which can be useful when members are unsure of the proposal's consequences or do not have enough information to decide Higher Conflict of interest: As part of proposal hygiene, Authors of the proposals tend to abstain from voting on their proposals even though they act in the best interest of the DAO. Furthermore, Voters tend to abstain from voting if there is a high conflict of interests as a voter and the proposed implications. Insufficient information: In case a proposal is moved to snapshot with insufficient information or data, a voter can choose to abstain, thus signalling their unwillingness to decide without further information or discussion The proposed changes will impact any existing quorums or the requirement to pass a proposal.

Rationale

This proposal aims to encourage members to participate in the voting process, which may have otherwise not participated due to a lack of clear stance on a proposal.

Considerations

There are no security implications with this proposal.

Once passed, the 1IPs should include ‘Abstain’ as a voting option

The Governance Doc of 1inch DAO should be updated through a GitHub pull request to update the changes

[1IP-14] Update 1inch DAO Voting Process to Include st1INCH(v2)#

Full Proposal Description

Simple Summary

This proposal seeks to modify the 1inch DAO governance process to allow st1INCH(v2) holders to vote on 1inch DAO Snapshot proposals.

Abstract

If passed, this proposal will allow st1INCH(v2) holders to participate in 1inch DAO Snapshot votes.

Legacy st1INCH and v1INCH will have unchanged voting weights.

Motivation

With the passing of [1IP-11] 1inch Staking Pods, and the subsequent launch of 1inch Fusion mode, st1INCH(v2) has become the primary utility token of 1inch Network. In recent weeks, st1INCH(v2) has overtaken legacy st1INCH in terms of supply.

This proposal will enfranchise st1INCH(v2) holders and should increase the number of active participants in the 1inch DAO.

Specification

The 1inch Network Snapshot space will be updated to account for st1INCH(v2) voting power. Meaning, st1INCH (v2) will be added as a new “strategy” with equal voting weight to legacy st1INCH. Holders would then be able to use their respective voting weights when participating in votes on proposals.

Token Contracts

Rationale

V2 stakers have demonstrated commitment to the 1inch Network and deserve an equal say in how the protocol is governed. By introducing this class of voters, we can better reflect community sentiment while ensuring that those with vested interests remain incentivized towards long-term success of the network.

Legacy st1INCH will retain its voting power for the time being. It is expected that the DAO will vote to deprecate legacy st1INCH voting rights in the coming months as more of the stake migrates to the new contracts.

Considerations

There are no security implications with this proposal.

Once passed, the reality.eth proposal acceptance criteria will need to be updated to reflect the change.

[1IP-13] Governance Process Improvements#

Full Proposal Description

Author: Bobbay_StableNode

References

1inch governance process

Simple Summary

1IP-13 “Governance Process Improvements” introduces changes to the current governance process to create a more agile yet robust process.

Abstract

It takes around 12 days to implement a change via governance. This is time-consuming, especially since there is no express pathway to execute proposals in time-sensitive situations.

1IP-13 will reduce the current governance timeline in different ways to ensure that governance changes can be enacted swiftly without compromising security.

Motivation

The current 1inch governance framework is far too long, which can hinder the DAOs ability to execute quickly.

Specification

  1. Current Process
  2. Amendments
  3. New Process

Current Process

The current process can be found here, but here is a summary.

Phase 1 (Discussion) & Phase 2 (1IP formalization) have an open-ended duration, so they have no specific deadline.

Phase 3 (temperature check) lasts five days. Proposals stay unchanged in this phase.

Phase 4 (Snapshot Vote) lasts seven days.

Phase 5 (Implementation) lasts a minimum of six days - This can be ignored since it does not involve the community.

This means that the current governance process (ignoring phase 5) totals a minimum of 12 days to pass a proposal.

Amendments

We recommend the following amendments:

  • Phase 3 -  Reduce from five days to three days.
  • Phase 4  - Reduce from seven days to five days

These changes ensure enough time to cast a forum and snapshot vote without compromising security. Across other DAOs, having a Snapshot vote last around five days is common practice. It provides a grey area between 3 days (too short) and 7 days (too long).

New Process

  • Phase 1 & Phase 2  - Open-ended
  • Phase 3 -  Lasts three days
  • Phase 4  - Lasts five days
  • Phase 5 - Lasts seven days

This new governance process (ignoring phase 5) totals a minimum of 8 days to pass a proposal instead of the original 12 days.

Rationale

The lengthy process has hindered the DAOs’ ability to execute promptly in the past. This reduction will still ensure a suitable amount of time for DAO members to participate in the DAO without sacrificing security.

Considerations

This will make it easier for the DAO to pass proposals that could open a security risk to malicious actors.

Next Steps

  1. Discuss the Proposal
  2. Forum temperature check
  3. Move it to a vote
    1. [Yes]: Implement these governance changes
    2. [No]: Do not implement these governance changes

[1IP-12] Improve Fusion Auction Resolver Competition#

Full Proposal Description

Simple Summary

This proposal seeks to modify 1inch Fusion to allow all five of the top resolvers to fill orders during the entire duration of the Dutch Auction.

Abstract

If passed, this proposal will change the way that 1inch Fusion orders are filled by allowing all five resolvers to participate in every stage of the Dutch auction. This change will increase competition amongst resolvers and ensure that users are getting the best rates.

Motivation

Currently, the top five resolvers are given fill priority according to their Unicorn Power. For the first minute of the Dutch auction, only the resolver with the highest Unicorn Power can fill the order. Then, the resolver with the second most Unicorn Power joins them for the second minute, and so forth… This proposal will foster a more competitive auction by giving all resolvers equal priority.

This proposal aims to increase competition amongst resolvers and thus provide better rates for users when they make swaps via the 1inch Network.

Specification

This proposal serves as a signal from the 1inch Network DAO to 1inch Labs. Once passed, the 1inch Network DAO calls for 1inch Labs to modify the Fusion logic to allow all five resolvers to participate in every stage of the Dutch auction.

Above is the existing Fusion auction order structure.

Below is the modified Fusion auction order structure that this proposal calls for.

Rationale

Allowing for pure competition amongst the five resolvers, rather than giving preferential access based on staking power, will facilitate better swap rates and faster execution times.

This change will also make it more attractive for professional market makers to become resolvers, which may lead to a greater demand for 1INCH token as they accumulate the necessary Unicorn Power.

Considerations

1inch Fusion mode has already been audited and deployed. This proposal will have no negative security implications as it will only change the structure of the Dutch auction.

An increase in the number of resolvers participating in the Fusion auctions should reduce the likelihood of resolver collusion.

[1IP-11] 1inch Staking Pods#

Full Proposal Description

Author: @Bobbay_stablenode

References:

GitHub - 1inch/erc20-pods 7,GitHub - 1inch/farming 5,GitHub - 1inch/delegating 1

Simple Summary

This proposal seeks to implement a new Staking Pod mechanic for the 1INCH token. This system will consist of:

  • Incentivised time-locked 1INCH staking
  • Permissionless delegation pods
  • Reward distribution compatibility
  • 50% of all current, and future, 1inch DAO protocol revenue shall be distributed to stakers

Abstract

With the Staking Pod system, users lock their 1INCH tokens in a staking contract to get st1INCH tokens — the longer the lock period, the more st1INCH tokens the user gets. st1INCH tokens can be used by stakers for 1inch DAO governance, and the 1inch DAO can choose to use these token balances for reward distribution. The system is modular as anyone can launch a new Modular Delegation Pod and can use the reward functionality to incentivize certain actions and/or assign utility to the 1INCH token. 50% of all current, and future, 1inch DAO revenue shall be distributed to stakers.

Motivation

1INCH token is the governance token of the 1inch Network. It provides voting rights within the 1inch DAO’s governance system, and users can stake it to receive a refund 3 on their transaction fees. However, despite these functions, the amount of 1INCH tokens currently being held in staking contracts is quite low and governance participation is even lower. We believe that this is due to a lack of incentives to participate in governance and a lack of additional utility for staked 1INCH.

By introducing Modular Staking Pods, we hope to give stakers more direct control over how their stake is used to power the 1inch Network. This change will allow them to independently select how their stake governs each of the protocols and will allow for rewards to permissionlessly be distributed based on the actions of the stakers. We envision that this will improve the goverance by aligning incentives between people who want to stake to earn rewards and those who are interested in protocol governance – both players will have direct incentives to participate in the same system.

We believe that this proposal represents a step forward for the 1inch Network and that it will help increase adoption and usage of the network’s future protocols.

Specification

Staking

Like the existing 1INCH staking contract, users will be able to lock their 1INCH tokens in the staking contract to get st1INCH tokens that can be used for 1inch DAO governance. However, unlike the current system, Modular Staking will require users to lock their 1INCH for a set amount of time.

Locking

The minimum and maximum lock periods are chosen by the DAO through — for the purposes of analysis, we’ll use 1 month and 2 years as the minimum and maximum staking periods respectively. st1INCH tokens grant users “voting power” which they can use for various use cases. The longer the locking period the more “voting power” resolver can get. However, the increase in power is not linear.

There will be a minimum locking period of 1 month.

Note that st1INCH voting power will decay over time according to the locking curve. Also note that users can re-lock their stake at any time to refresh their st1INCH balance. Users will be able to withdraw their stake early but will forfeit a portion of their rewards.

Orange is the amount lost when a staker withdraws earlier than they originally committed.

Example:

  • In 2023, Sally stakes 100 1INCH and selects a 2-year lock period.

  • They receive 100 st1INCH from the staking contract and this balance decays over time.

  • By 2024 Sally’s st1INCH balance has decayed to 22.36

  • Sally then chooses to re-lock her stake for the maximum amount of time, 2-years, and her st1INCH balance is increased to 100.

  • Sally chose not to re-lock, and in 2026, after the lock period, she withdraws her original 100 1INCH.

Unlocking

If a st1INCH staker wishes to unlock they will forfeit some of their tokens based on the following equation:

withdrawalAmount = (balance - votingPower) / 0.9

penalty = balance - withdrawalAmount

In this setting, the maximum early withdrawal loss is 90% as the minimum locking period is 1 month

Admin Control

The 1inch DAO Treasury Address, 0x7951c7ef839e26F63DA87a42C9a87986507f1c07, would act as admin of the staking contract with control over the following functions:

  • setFeeReceiver – this would allow the DAO to change the vault to collect the rewards for later distribution between stakers and the DAO treasury.

  • setDefaultFarm – this would allow the DAO to change the default reward distribution contract for 1INCH staking.

  • setMaxLossRatio – this would allow the DAO to change the earliest point at which people can early withdraw their stake by disallowing withdrawals with larger withdrawal fees.

  • setEmergencyExit – This is basically an abort function and would allow the DAO to end the staking scheme. All stakers can reclaim the entire amount of their original stake regardless of their remaining locking period. This would be used if the DAO wanted to migrate to a new staking contract to change key variables, like the maximum lock period.

Modular Delegation

The Modular Delegation system provides users with a set of delegation contracts that are specific to a topic. The set of delegation contracts is permissionless, meaning that anyone can deploy one and allow users to delegate their st1INCH within it.

The 1inch DAO will have the power to endorse a delegation contract and feature it in the 1inch staking UI.

For the start, we propose just two delegation topics:

Snapshot governance delegation

st1INCH utility delegation

  • As part of this staking upgrade, there will be a new protocol added to 1inch’s suite of DeFi tools that will substantially improve the utility of st1INCH.
  • Service providers that want to tap into the utility of st1INCH can proposition the community for delegated power.

Rewards

Modular Staking will have two levels of reward functionality: Generic st1INCH rewards and Modular Delegation rewards.

Generic st1INCH rewards

The st1INCH contract will allow anyone to run a farm to distribute rewards to everyone holding st1INCH tokens.

Users also have the ability to to join as many farms as they want as it does not required a user to move their st1inch to a specific farm. Along as a user holds st1inch in their account, they can receive rewards from multiple farms.

This proposal calls for 50% of all current, and future, 1inch DAO revenue to be distributed to stakers in the form of 1INCH.

Modular Delegation rewards

Some Modular Delegation contracts have  an integrated rewards function that anyone can run a farm atop.

The main advantage to this type of reward is that it is not limited to being proportional to a user’s st1INCH holdings. Any action, onchain or offchain, can be used as the basis of reward distribution. This functionality could be used by the 1inch DAO to incentivize anything from editing 1IPs to using a new 1inch protocol (and everything in between).

Example: The 1inch DAO may use the Snapshot governance delegation contract to incentivize active governance participation by boosting the st1INCH rewards of people who vote on proposals, delegate their st1INCH to active voters, etc…

Rationale

The rationale for this proposal is to provide a more flexible staking system that can be used to incentivize various activities within the 1inch Network. The new Modular Delegation contracts will allow for rewards to be distributed based on anything from voting on proposals to using new 1inch protocols. This will provide a greater incentive for users to participate in the network and help drive adoption of new 1inch products and services.

Considerations

The security considerations for this proposal are mainly around the potential for abuse of the new staking and delegation contracts. It is important to ensure that there are adequate safeguards in place to prevent users from delegating their voting power to malicious actors.

The governance considerations for this proposal include the impact on revenue streams and changes to the governance processes. This proposal could potentially increase revenue for the 1inch DAO if it is successful in incentivizing more users to participate in the network. It is also worth considering how these changes will impact existing voting processes within the 1inch DAO since the existing staking contract will be deprecated.

[1IP-09] Collect 1inch DAO Treasury Revenue in 1INCH Token in Addition to USDC#

Full Proposal Description

Simple Summary

This proposal seeks to modify the 1inch Network DAO Treasury’s revenue collection strategy by enacting the following changes:

  • Switch from buying USDC with Swap Surplus revenue to buying 1INCH when the price is lower than $1.30.
  • Switch from buying 1INCH with Swap Surplus revenue to buying USDC the price of 1INCH is greater than or equal to $1.70.

Abstract

Currently, the Swap Surplus revenue stream is collected in varying tokens and swapped to USDC before it is then sent to the 1inch DAO Treasury. Once enacted, this proposal will instead swap these tokens to 1INCH as long as the market price of 1INCH is below the $1.30 to $1.70 range (see the Specification section for a detailed explanation). All swaps will be done using the 1inch Aggregation Protocol to ensure the best pricing.

Motivation

Benefits to the 1inch Network DAO include:

  • Investing the DAO’s revenue stream into the protocol’s governance token while the governance token is lower than it was previously valued.
  • Potential upward pressure on the 1INCH token as the DAO Treasury will be a net buyer of cheap 1INCH.
  • When the token is trading at higher valuations, the Treasury will automatically de-risk by collecting revenue in stable coins.
  • Holding 1INCH within the 1inch DAO Treasury will allow the Treasury to scale its value with the performance of the token.

Specification

This proposal serves as a signal from the 1inch Network DAO to 1inch Labs. Once passed, the 1inch Network DAO calls for 1inch Labs to modify the fee collection strategy with the following changes:

  • When the price of 1INCH moves is below $1.30, Swap Surplus revenue shall start to be collected in 1INCH.
  • When the price of 1INCH moves above $1.70, Swap Surplus revenue shall be collected in USDC.

Once the modifications have been made and tested, 1inch Labs shall deploy them. All future modifications to these will need to be done by a 1inch DAO Governance vote.

Rationale

This proposal aims to purchase 1INCH with treasury revenue when the price is lower than ~$1.50. $0.20 bands are used on either side of this buying point in order to dampen the impact that market volatility could have.

This price point of 1INCH that triggers the switch can be changed in the future via a governance vote.

Considerations

Market Risk

The USDC stablecoin composition of the 1inch DAO Treasury puts the Treasury in a very good position during any bearish market cycles — the Treasury constantly grows in dollar value while, in contrast, projects that primarily hold their own token, have had the real value of their Treasury shrink in the last 6 months.

Adding 1INCH to the Treasury composition will increase both the potential risk and potential returns. This proposal dampens the volatility by maintaining a mix of risk-on and risk-off assets.

Added Complexity

If enacted, this proposal will add complexity to the Treasury Revenue collection strategy.

[1IP-08] Simple diversification mechanism for 1inch DAO Treasury#

Full Proposal Description

Simple Summary

This proposal seeks to diversify the 1inch Network DAO’s Treasury composition be enacting the following strategy:

  • Do not exchange a whitelisted set of tokens for USDC before sending to the 1inch DAO Treasury.
  • These whitelisted tokens shall be: ETH, WETH, WBTC, DAI, and USDT.

Abstract

Currently, all of the Swap Surplus revenue stream is collected in varying tokens and swapped to USDC before being sent to the 1inch DAO Treasury. To start the diversification process of the treasury funds, the protocol can keep some incoming Swap Surplus tokens as collected (not swapping them for USDC).

This proposal aims to whitelist the following tokens for this treasury collection strategy:

  • ETH
  • WETH
  • WBTC
  • DAI
  • USDT

Motivation

The 1inch DAO Treasury is 100% composed of USDC. USDC is a fiat-backed stablecoin pegged to USD managed by Circle.

USD experienced record inflation over the last 12 months, and will experience some degree of inflation for perpetuity. As such, the marginal spending power of the 1inch DAO Treasury is weakened unless the DAO deploys the funds in a manner that can outpace inflation.

These assets are viewed as risk-on diversification assets for the treasury:

  • ETH – the native asset of the Ethereum blockchain
  • WETH – ETH wrapped in an ERC20 wrapper
  • WBTC – Bitcoin (BTC) is the oldest and largest digital asset. WBTC is Bitcoin wrapped in an ERC20 wrapper

Stablecoins also have inherent risks such as smart contract risks and centralization risks. Diversifying the stable coin holdings of the 1inch DAO Treasury aims to hedge against these risks. These assets are viewed as risk-off assets for the treasury:

  • DAI – the decentralized collateral-backed stablecoin issued by the Maker Protocol. DAI is soft-pegged to USD
  • USDT – the fiat-backed stablecoin pegged to USD and managed by Tether

Specification

To implement this proposal, GovernanceLeftoverExchanger should transfer ETH, WETH, WBTC, DAI and USDT directly to the treasury the same way it transfers USDC. All other tokens should still be converted to USDC as they are now.

Rationale

The crypto market cap took a decline in recent months. With token valuations depressed, it may be a good time to start accumulating non-stable tokens to grow the treasury.

Since exchange transactions cost some Ether to pay for the gas fees, eliminating the swapping step for these whitelisted tokens will increase the capital efficiency of this operation. It is also for this reason that large stable coins such as DAI and USDT, should be sent directly to the treasury.

Considerations

The current stablecoin composition of the 1inch DAO Treasury ensures that the Treasury is insulated from bearish market cycles. However, this also means the treasury’s funds have no way to keep pace with the rise in inflation. Adding ETH, WETH and WBTC increase both the risk and the potential rewards.

This proposal does not call for any actions to be taken with the funds currently held by the 1inch DAO Treasury.

[1IP-07] Integrate Balancer Boosted Pools in the 1inch Aggregation Protocol#

Full Proposal Description

Simple Summary

This proposal calls for the integration of Balancer Boosted Pools into the 1inch Aggregation Protocol.

Abstract

This proposal aims to grow the kinds of liquidity sources compatible with the 1inch Aggregation Protocol by integrating Balancer Boosted Pools. To fund this development, a BAL grant from Balancer DAO and Balancer DAO will be awarded to 1inch Labs upon the successful completion of the integration. Specifically, the following

  1. 1inch Labs shall integrate the Balancer Boosted Pools into the 1inch smart contracts, the 1inch dApp, and the 1inch API.
  2. The integration shall be live on the Ethereum main-net no later than 3 weeks after this proposal passes the Phase-4 snapshot vote.
  3. If both conditions 1 and 2 are met, Balancer DAO and Balancer DAO will transfer 20k BAL or the equivalent in stablecoins (as determined by Balancer DAO) to 1inch Labs.

Motivation

Balancer Boosted Pools are a new pool type that have been gaining traction from many DeFi protocols. These pools were previously discussed with the 1inch community on the 1inch Governance Forum as well as the 1inch Network DAO Community Call #02.

Given that this is a new pool type and requires effort from 1inch Labs, Balancer seeks to fund this integration via a payment of 20,000 BAL to 1inch Labs.

Specification

At a high level, integration of Balancer Boosted Pools would require support for Balancer’s BatchSwap function, the routing of trades through multiple Balancer pools including linear pools nested in the boosted pool and the math in the linear pools. This proposal hopes that the support for Boosted Pools is general and can later be expanded to new future Boosted Pools. The integration of Balancer’s BatchSwap function within the 1inch Network will also be able to be used for pools other than Boosted Pools which would benefit both the 1inch Network and Balancer as it would allow for cheaper execution of trades from the wider Balancer pool types. In the near future we expect to see meta pools created with the BPT of Boosted Pools, an example would be a bbaUSD/WETH pool. Routing trades through such pools would include one or more extra hop through Balancer’s BatchSwap function.

We expect that there will be many new Boosted Pools across all networks in near future, namely poos in collaboration with Ampleforth and Olympus although, below is a non-exhaustive list of currently live Boosted Pools on Ethereum L1:

  1. bbaUSD, containing 300mm of DAI/USDC/USDT TVL
  2. bbfUSD, expected to contain at least 50mm of FEI/LUSD/DAI

This is contingent on the same proposal passing through the BalancerDAO.

Upon satisfactory integration Note1, 20,000 BAL shall be sent to 1inch Labs ETH address:

0x2DF104682A61241C79eBB3ce3b2C293578bF6A9D.

Note 1: Satisfactory integration is defined as the 1inch Aggregation Protocol accurately forwarding trades through the bbaUSD and the bbfUSD pools, on Ethereum main-net, when those pools offer the optimal pricing for the end-user.

Rationale

Support for the mentioned pools will unlock $350mm of efficient TVL for the 1inch Aggregation Protocol and allow it to have access to cheap liquidity for trade routing at the moment of integration and much more TVL in the future as Boosted Pool continue their adoption. Additionally, Boosted Pools have been adapted by BeethovenX, Balancer’s Friendly Fork on Fantom and, integrating them would provide a good source for volume to 1inch on Fantom as well.

Balancer Boosted Pools are in much demand from other DeFi protocols due to their innovation in capital efficiency thus, it is expected to see many more Balancer Boosted Pools with high TVL in collaboration with other DAOs, some of which were mentioned in the discussion on the forum. Supporting Boosted Pools will position the 1inch aggregator to be able to rapidly integrate any new Boosted Pools launched.

This BAL grant would be used by 1inch Labs to fund the development of this integration.

Considerations

The technical specifics of this integration will be defined by 1inch Labs. Like all new modules they have launched, a complete internal security review and audit should be performed before this change is implemented on main-net.

Because Balancer DAO is directly funding this integration, other upgrades to the 1inch Network can be made in parallel.

[1IP-05] Add Derivative Aggregation to 1inch Network#

Full Proposal Description

Simple Summary

This proposal seeks to add derivative aggregation to the 1inch Protocol. Specifically, it calls for the following additions:

  • Aggregation Protocol is expanded to include derivatives
  • Add derivative aggregation to the 1inch smart contracts, 1inch dApp, and 1inch API
  • The first derivative supported will be Opium’s TURBO products (call options)

Abstract

This proposal aims to signal to the 1inch Foundation that the DAO wants to add derivative aggregation to the 1inch Protocol – specifically, the 1inch smart contracts, the 1inch dApp, and the 1inch API. Adding derivative aggregation to the protocol will require technical effort from 1inch Labs, and will require the support of 1inch Foundation.

Motivation

1inch is currently the leading decentralized exchange aggregator and has made a reputation of providing the best prices on token swaps. With the rise of derivatives in the DeFi space, there is a new product niche that 1inch is perfectly positioned to capitalize on: the aggregation of derivative products.

By implementing this proposal, 1inch will solve the problem of fractured derivative liquidity (just like it previously solved fractured token liquidity).

Specification

This proposal serves as a signal from the 1inch Network DAO to the 1inch Foundation and 1inch Labs. Once passed, the 1inch Network DAO calls for the 1inch Foundation to allot resources to add derivative aggregation to the 1inch Protocol and dApp, and for 1inch Labs to add derivative aggregation to the 1inch smart contracts and 1inch API.

Opium’s TURBO product is a short-dated call option:

  • Community / users can “write” covered calls by pooling their tokens in order to earn yield (collect call option premiums)
  • Takers (professional market makers) can buy the call options in order to gain leveraged exposure to the underlying asset

Adding Opium’s TURBO options to the aggregation UI will require coordination with the Opium community to ensure a smooth integration.

Rationale

The architecture of the aggregation protocol has not yet been defined.

Opium’s TURBO product was chosen as the first derivative supported because the Opium community was offering to help with this integration via documentation and SDKs.

Considerations

The specifics of launching an aggregation protocol will not be defined until the 1inch Foundation supports the proposal. Like all new modules they have launched, a complete security review and audit should be performed before this change is implemented on mainnet.

Since all work described in this proposal will be organized by the 1inch Foundation, this will not cost any treasury funds.

Not-Passed#

All 1IPs that did not pass the Phase-4 vote. These 1IPs did not meet the minimum quorum, and/or a majority of the voting weight was opposed to the change:

[1IP-23] Allocate $900,000 in $ARB to Purchase a Lamborghini Revuelto for Marketing Purposes#

[1IP-22] A Community First 1inch DAO NFT Marketplace#

[1IP-10] 1inch DAO SAFE Airdrop Claim#

[1IP-06] Donation of 1inch DAO Treasury Funds to support Ukraine’s humanitarian crisis#

[1IP-03] VOTE to make $1INCH deflationary!#

[1IP-01] 1inch Trading Incentives - Discount, Swap Fee & Slippage Subsidies#